American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

2012

How Well Does the G20 Reflect African Interests and Priorities?:
Some Thoughts Following the Los Cabos, Mexico Summit
Daniel D. Bradlow

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

SAFPI Policy Brief No 6
August 2012

How well does the G20 reflect African interests and priorities?
Some thoughts following the Los Cabos, Mexico summit
Daniel Bradlow*
The leaders of the G20 countries have now held
seven summits - enough to begin critically
evaluating how well the G20 serves the interest of
specific sub-parts of the international community.
The purpose of this policy brief is to assess how
well the G20 responds to African interests. It is
divided into three parts. The first is a brief
description of the most recent summit, held on
June 18-19, 2012 in Los Cabos, Mexico. The
second part is a brief discussion of the criteria
that will be used in this evaluation. The third part
is an assessment of the G20 against these
criteria.
The Los Cabos summit
The G20 summit is the culmination of a busy
schedule of meetings of senior policy makers and
technical experts. The participants in these
meetings
include,
in
addition
to
the
representatives of the G20 states themselves,
officials from international organizations such as
the IMF, the World Bank, the regional
development banks, the FSB, OECD, ILO,
UNCTAD, WTO, and UNDP. Representatives of
regional organizations, such as the AU and
NEPAD, are present at the summit. The purpose
of these meetings is to follow up on the decisions
and requests of the G20 leaders, promote
cooperation between the participants of the G20
process on particular issues, and to help shape
the summit discussions and communiqué.
So far, the host country for each year’s summit
has served as the chair of the G20 during that
year, even though the individual G20 working
groups, panels and task forces will have their own
chairs.
The host state is responsible for
organizing and chairing the summit’s preparatory
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meetings and the summit itself. This allows the
host country to influence both the G20’s agenda
for that year and its future work programme. For
example, Mexico as the 2012 host nation,
focused attention on green growth and job
creation.
Since the G20 does not have a permanent
secretariat,
the
participating
international
organizations usually assume responsibility for
preparing the background studies and policy
proposals for the leaders of the G20 and may
play a role in implementing their decisions. For
example, the FSB and the IMF coordinate many
of the studies on financial regulatory issues and
the IMF serves as the leading independent
assessor in the mutual assessment program that
the G20 countries are implementing. These
organizations also help transmit G20 initiatives,
for example those relating to financial sector
regulation, to the other states in the global
system.
The final point to note about the evolving G20
process is the growing range of affiliated
meetings held in conjunction with the G20
process. In the case of the Los Cabos summit,
Mexico organized meetings of business leaders,
labour, youth, think tanks, and civil society from
the G20 countries. These meetings may result in
reports which can feed into the G20 process.
The results of Los Cabos
The “Los Cabos Leadership Declaration”, the
communiqué issued by the leaders at the end of
the summit, makes clear that, although the 2012
G20 summit was dominated by the Eurozone
crisis, the leaders discussed other matters.
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One noteworthy action announced at the summit
was that a group of countries, including all the
BRICS countries, agreed to lend new funds to the
IMF for use in future IMF operations, including in
the Eurozone. Many of these countries are
hoping that their contributions will help accelerate
IMF governance reform.

It is divided into the following sections: supporting
economic stabilization and the global recovery;
employment and social protection; trade;
strengthening
the
international
financial
architecture; reforming the financial sector and
fostering financial inclusion; enhancing food
security and addressing commodity price
volatility; meeting the challenges of development;
promoting longer term prosperity through
inclusive green growth; and intensifying the fight
against corruption.

The progress report of the G20 Development
Working Group presented at Los Cabos is of
particular interest to Africa. This report reaffirms
the G20’s commitment to promoting such
international objectives as the Millenium
Development
Goals
and
development
effectiveness. In addition, the report discusses, in
some detail, implementation of the Working
Group’s priorities - infrastructure, food security
and inclusive green growth. For example, the
document stipulates in paragraph 14 that
“incorporating social and environmental costs and
benefits into economic decision making” is
“critical” to inclusive green growth”. In regard, to
infrastructure it states in paragraph 16 that its
approach
to
infrastructure
should
seek
“synergies” with inclusive green growth and the
Group’s development pillars - food security,
human resource development, trade, private
investment with job creation, growth with
resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource
mobilization, and knowledge sharing. It adds, in
the same paragraph, that “adequately designed
infrastructure investments offer opportunities for
triple wins: economic growth, social inclusion and
greater environmental sustainability”. In regard to
food security, the report, in paragraph 27,
highlights the importance of agricultural research
and welcomes the work that is being done by
other international bodies. It also encourages, in
paragraph 31, all countries to support the
“Principles
for
Responsible
Agricultural
Investment” and the “Voluntary Guidelines on the
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and
Forest in the Context of National Food Security”.

In each section the leaders explain why they think
the issue is important and they commit, or often
recommit, themselves to certain objectives.
However, they do not specify what actions they
will take to reach these objectives. They also
request different actors, such as their ministers of
finance or specific groups of international
organizations, to undertake certain studies or
prepare particular reports.
The leaders also issued a “Los Cabos Growth
and Jobs Action Plan” in which they promise to
undertake a range of country and group specific
measures to protect the integrity of the Eurozone,
promote fiscal sustainability, price stability, and
job creation. They also released a document
containing the relevant policy commitments of
each G20 member state. Most of the participating
states, however, have previously committed
themselves to these actions in earlier G20
meetings and/or in domestic policy documents.
At Los Cabos, the participants also re-asserted
their
determination
to
implement
the
“Accountability Assessment Framework”, which
creates a process of peer review evaluations of
each participating state’s implementation of the
G20’s “strong, sustainable and balanced” growth
framework. The first report on this mutual
assessment process, in which the IMF assists,
was issued at Los Cabos.
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nations, the poorest individuals, and the smallest
companies to share in their benefits. They also
share an interest in promoting balanced economic
growth and development that is environmentally
sustainable. Finally, all African nations seek
effective
global
economic
governance
arrangements in which all stakeholders are able
to participate.

Criteria for evaluating the G20
The criteria for evaluating how well the G20
serves African interests needs to be based on an
understanding of both the functions of the G20
and of “African interests”.
The functions of the G20
The G20 performs three functions. First, it is a
crisis manager. In this capacity it is focused on
forging agreement on the actions that the
participants, individually and collectively, must
take in order to try and resolve the crisis.

Given these functions, there are four tests that
can be used to determine how well the G20
responds to African interests:
•

Second, the G20 is an actor in global economic
governance. It is the setting in which the major
economies meet with the major international
institutions - the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO,
the UN - to discuss the key economic challenges
facing the international community. The G20,
therefore, enables the relevant policy makers and
technical experts from the participating countries
and international organizations to meet and seek
to develop common understandings and
approaches on particular issues of global
importance.

•

•

•

Third, the G20 is a communicator. It helps to
promote international global awareness of the
challenges facing the global community and the
approach that the most powerful countries are
considering for dealing with these challenges.

How well does the G20 address the
challenges created by the lack of
inclusiveness - that is poverty, inequality,
unemployment, and the inability of citizens
to engage in national affairs?
How effectively does the G20 respond to
the difficult environmental challenges that
Africa is facing?
How effectively does the G20 support
Africa’s ability to mobilize resources to
finance its development?
Does the G20 promote global economic
governance arrangements that allow for
meaningful
participation
by
all
stakeholders, and that are transparent and
accountable?

Evaluating the G20
Addressing inclusion

Defining “African interests”

At a rhetorical level the G20 can claim some
success in making development more inclusive.
The Los Cabos communiqués talks about the
importance of inclusive green growth, job
creation, social security and financial inclusion.
However, the documents do not define what
“inclusion” means for the G20 nor do they provide
any guidance on the strategy for achieving it. This
is particularly important given that there is no
general consensus on how inclusion can be most
effectively incorporated into the way in which

A continent with many diverse countries does not
have one undifferentiated set of interests.
Nevertheless, all sub-Saharan African countries
do have some common concerns that can be
considered to be “African interests” for this
purpose. They all would benefit from economic
policies and practices, at the global and national
level, that are inclusive, in the sense that they
allow all stakeholders, including the weakest
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neither document evidences any attempt by the
G20 to carefully consider how this should be
done. There is no discussion in these documents
on how to manage the complex trade-offs
between maximizing economic benefits and
mitigating the environmental and social costs that
are likely to be required in regard to inclusive
green growth, sustainable infrastructure, and
environmental sensitive economic decision
making. This is particularly troubling because
there is clear evidence that these trade-offs exist,
are complicated, capable of generating intense
and sustained conflicts, and are seldom
effectively resolved.

specific development policies are made and
projects are selected, prepared, implemented,
and operated.
The G20 seems to address this issue indirectly
through its institutional arrangements and work
programme. For example, the creation of the
Development Working Group, in part, is an effort
to make sure that the concerns of developing
countries are included in global economic
governance. In addition, the G20 has created a
group to work on financial inclusion and has
asked the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision to study the impact of specific
financial regulatory reforms on emerging markets
and developing countries. It has also taken
actions that are designed to reduce the volatility
in commodity markets and to promote food
security The G20 has also played a role in
seeking to reform the governance structures of
the multilateral development banks and the IMF
and in ensuring that they have sufficient
resources to fulfil their mandates, which, at least
to some extent, deal with the challenge of
exclusion at the level of the global economic
system. These measures are all still in the
process of being implemented and so it is too
soon to judge their efficacy.

Resource mobilization
Africa needs additional resources to finance its
economic development. While the G20 is not a
fund-raising body, it does pay attention to this
issue. For example, it has expressed an interest
in promoting more inclusive finance and one task
assigned to its High Level Panel on Infrastructure
was to identify innovative ways of financing
infrastructure projects.
In addition, the
Development Working Group includes domestic
resource mobilization as one of its development
“pillars”. However, the G20 appears to view its
function in this regard to be to highlight the issue
rather to resolve it. Its documents provide very
little information on how the G20 plans to address
the challenges that developing countries,
particularly African countries, face in mobilizing
resources. It praises a number of existing
initiatives but does not propose any new ones.

Environmental challenges
Africa is facing a number of important
environmental challenges - for example, climate
change, water shortages - that have the potential
to constrain African efforts to deal with the
problems of food security, infrastructure,
urbanization, and job creation. The G20 does
address these issues in its Los Cabos
communiqué, where it discusses issues like
green growth and food security. In addition, the
Development Working Group in its report
emphasizes the importance of incorporating
environmental considerations into economic
decision making, and infrastructure project
planning, construction, and operation. However,
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Global Economic Governance

interested parties on the content of these
meetings. The latter group are reduced to
learning about the work of the G20 and the
content of these meetings from the G20
documents which are publicly available on its
website, the content of which is determined by the
G20 chair for that year. The media also play an
important role in this regard.

African countries are under-represented in the
G20. Thus, they have a strong interest in G20
undertaking
efforts
to
promote
greater
participation in its process, and greater
accountability to those affected by its decisions
and actions. To date, the G20 has not responded
effectively to these interests.

Finally, it is difficult for interested stakeholders to
hold the G20 accountable.
While individual
leaders and their governments may have to
answer for their actions in the G20 through the
electoral processes in each member country,
there are no mechanisms through which
interested persons can hold the G20 participants
collectively or individually accountable for their
failure to address particular issues, their approach
to those issues that they do address, or for their
failure to consult or to report back to their various
stakeholders. One example of the problems that
this can create is that the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, because it did not consult
fully with all states and regulatory authorities that
were not members of the Committee, failed to
fully appreciate the impact of its imposed new
capital adequacy standards on developing
countries. As a result, the G20 has been forced to
request a new study to review this matter.

One reason for this is the composition of the G20.
The participants in the G20 process are a selfselected group of countries, together with those
other inter-governmental and non-governmental
participants that the members themselves choose
to invite. These participants have no formal
obligation to consult with other stakeholders
about their agenda, work plan or decisions. The
fact that the level of consultation is at the
discretion of the various participants does not,
however, mean that the participants do not
consult with others. For example, South Africa
does consult with other African countries through
the C10, a grouping of African Ministers of
Finance and central bank governors. In addition,
the amount of consultation undertaken by each
summit chair will vary. For example, the Mexicans
organized meetings with business leaders, labour
leaders, think tanks and researchers, youth and
civil society from G20 countries prior to Los
Cabos. However, the invitees to these meetings
attended in their personal capacities and without
any mandate from broader groupings in their own
countries. These meetings were arranged at the
discretion of the Mexicans and there is no
guarantee that the Russians, the next G20 chair,
will be as participatory in their approach.
Moreover, there is no formal process through
which interested stakeholders, who were not
invited to these meetings, can submit information
to these meetings or to the formal meetings in the
G20 process.

Conclusion
The G20 has now been operating at a summit
level for long enough that it is possible to begin
critically assessing its performance. This paper is
a first attempt to evaluate how responsive the
G20 is to African interests. It identifies three
functions that the G20 performs, and defines a
set of African interests to which the G20 could be
expected to respond. The paper then posits four
tests for determining the responsiveness to
African interests. It finds that the G20 does
address African interests in its formal documents.
However, this is often at a general level and
without either making commitments to specific

There is also no requirement that the G20 chair or
other participants in G20 meetings report back to
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actions or providing the specific details that could
assist African countries and their partners in
formulating and implementing their own strategies
for addressing these interests. This suggests that
the G20 performs its awareness promoting
function more effectively that its global economic
governance function. It would also seem to be
more effective at addressing the acute crises
experienced by the Northern countries than the
slower more endemic crises that afflict Africa.

*

Daniel Bradlow is SARCHI Professor of
International Development Law and African
Economic Relations, University of Pretoria and
Professor of Law, American University Washington
College of Law. He is also the co-coordinator of
the Global Economic Governance Africa project, a
joint project of the International Development Law
Unit, University of Pretoria and the South African
Institute for International Affairs.
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